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Inequality as a political issue was catapulted into political debate across the world in October 
2011, when activists occupied Zuccotti Park in Wall Street, New York – the world’s leading 
financial dentre - claiming to speak on behalf of the 99%, and against the 1%. Not long after, 
the runaway success of a book on economic history, Thomas Piketty’s Capital in the Twenty-
first Century, confirmed that inequality had become a key political topic. First published in 
2013, Capital has sold millions of copies in multiple languages and was for a while one of 
the most discussed books on both sides of the North Atlantic.1 And this attention is spread 
even more widely, as the Pew Global Attitudes Survey shows. Its 2002, 2007 and 2014 
waves, covering nations across the world, asked respondents to choose the ‘greatest threats to 
the world’ from a list including the spread of nuclear arms, infectious disease, pollution and 
the environment, religious and ethnic hatred and the ‘growing gap between rich and poor’. In 
2002, only respondents in two nations in the sample (Poland and India) placed inequality as 
their top concern; by 2014 those in ten nations, including the United States, France and 
Germany, had chosen this issue as their foremost concern. 
 
This chapter asks how and why inequality rose to the top of political concerns. A common 
explanation is the impact of the work of academic economists – especially of Piketty himself. 
In December 2012, even before Piketty published Capital, the US journal Foreign Policy put 
the French economist and his colleague Emmanuel Saez’s 24th in its list of Top 100 Global 
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Thinkers for having created ‘the graph that occupied Wall Street’ – a graph resulting from 
their work from the early 2000s showing the take off in the incomes of the top percentile in 
the US income distribution.2 While Foreign Policy’s boast has to be taken with a pinch of 
salt, the coincidence between the work of economists and the mobilization of social protest is 
worth considering. Why and how did the Occupy Wall Street (OWS) movement chose the 
‘1%’ as its enemy what were the reasons for the sudden success of Piketty’s work (which 
after all had been around since the early 2000s)? Despite the effects of the 2008 financial 
crisis, which were serious and continue to affect millions of people, it is not clear that there 
was a sudden spike in income inequality in the western countries at the time – if anything, 
there were slight reductions in the levels of within country inequality in richer western 
nations where the 99% movement took hold.3 So, although growing income disparities were a 
feature of many countries, the politics they generated were seldom expressed in the language 
of inequality. Even after 2008, this emphasis on economic inequality as mobiliser of protest 
was also not used to the same extent across different parts of the world. The ‘We are the 
99%’ slogan and associated arguments was principally a feature of the US (and to an extent 
British) manifestations of the cycle of protest opened up in 2011.  
 
This chapter is an attempt to think historically and transversally about the dynamics that led 
to the emergence of inequality in a particular framing – that of personal distribution by 
percentiles. Drawing work from several disciplines, it argues we need to seek an explanation 
in the interaction of three different processes: first, the trajectories of techniques and 
expertise used to describe the world; second, the western middle classes’ experience of 
inequality, the insecurity and anxieties it produces; and finally, the emergence of 
transnational protest movements, starting with the Global Justice Movement, and their 
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attempts to articulate a critique of capitalism that would connect across very diverse 
constituencies, interests and ideologies.  
 
In a recent paper, Daniel Hirschman has explored the making of the ‘1%’, arguing that the 
‘regimes of perceptibility’ of the economics profession – i.e. its theoretical assumptions and 
measurement tools - contributed to making the accumulation of incomes at first invisible, and 
more recently revealed as a series of ‘stylized facts’ about inequality.4 Building on 
scholarship on the co-construction of statistics and society, Hirschman refers us to the 
importance of knowledge in creating political issues. But on its own, the production of 
‘stylized facts’ is an insufficient basis for political action. Such knowledge can, however, be 
used to frame interpretations of circumstances and conditions. The concept of ‘framing’ was 
developed in social movement studies to explore the agency of political actors in mobilising 
constituencies by constructing identities, highlighting issues, diagnosing causes and strategies 
for addressing them. Framing mediates between the material conditions and mental states of 
potential constituencies and their purposeful collective action. 5 Yet not all frames gain 
acceptance with those to whom they are addressed: ‘resonance’, or the extent to which frames 
are adopted, depends on multiple factors, including the trustworthiness of its proponents and 
of the ‘facts’ that underpin it.6 It is in this last regard that this chapter makes a contribution, 
linking the availability of a growing body of authoritative knowledge about inequality, 
presented in a format and language that is currently considered legitimate and objective, to 
the political entrepreneurship of social movements in contexts (particularly the United States 
and the United Kingdom) where wide constituencies were open to such arguments.7 In short, 
this chapter seeks to explain the creation of a political issue through the interaction between 
socio-economic conditions, the tools producing social knowledge, and the political agency 
through which the two are combined. It argues these processes came together in a moment of 
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political opportunity afforded by the transnational financial crisis of 2008 and beyond. 
However, it also argues that the combination of these three factors has contributed to a 
discussion of inequality that is too narrow and, ultimately, liable to be ‘nationalised’, 
crowding out a more global approach to its causes. And in that sense, it may have played into 
the hands of the kinds of nationalist politics we see gaining strength across many western 
democracies. 
 
i. Inequality Knowledge 
 
The wording of the question in the Pew survey mentioned above is ambiguous: respondents 
were asked about how far they saw the growing gap between rich and poor as a threat to the 
world. But does this refer to global inequality, in the sense of either inequalities of income 
and resources between individuals, regardless of where in the world they live; or inequalities 
between countries in terms of national income aggregates; or are respondents primarily 
concerned about inequalities experienced within their own countries?8 This matters, since it 
either displays a growing awareness of global disparities, or simply the return of the politics 
of distribution to national debates.9 Although related, these three ways of seeing inequality 
are different political problems. Additionally, the Pew questionnaire leaves out other 
dimensions on which humans can be considered unequal: in terms of health, quality of life or 
education. How we define and describe inequality matters. The topic returned to the political 
agenda in 2011 in the language of economics – as inequalities of income between individuals. 
This is result of the growing weight of economics in public life, but also of the changes in the 
way economics itself looks at inequality. Over the last century the language of politics and 
policy has become increasingly quantitative, and the discipline of economics has grown in 
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status as the means and ends of government, with consequences for the kinds of ‘inequality’ 
knowledge available.10  
 
For most of its two centuries of existence, the discipline of economics tended to pay little 
attention to questions of distribution between individuals, making the form in which 
inequality has now appeared in debates difficult to establish. In the last twenty years, 
however, it has increasingly come to focus on inequality between individuals.  
 
Since choices in definition and measurement matter, it is important to consider how the 
production of knowledge about inequality has changed over time. While ranking of people 
and countries in terms of income is a relatively recent phenomenon, seeing the world in terms 
of hierarchies has a long history. However – particularly in the western tradition – these 
differences were attributed to prior characteristics, such as birth, function or holiness. They 
were justified for being natural or ‘god given’, or at least required to tame man’s ‘natural 
instincts’. At different points in time, such beliefs have been challenged by alternative 
accounts of human ‘nature’; and in western thought the idea of natural law (and humankind’s 
equality before it) emerging from the eighteenth century laid the foundations for a challenge 
on such justifications for inequalities of power, status and wealth.11 It was also around this 
time that, aided by novel ways of representing society quantitatively - such as social tables 
and pioneering censuses - and visions of the economy promising progress and abundance, 
that some voices (including Paine and Condorcet) argued it would be possible for human 
societies to match the equality of human nature with a reduction of inequality of wealth 
through redistribution.12 Despite that radical moment, and even as the wealth gap between the 
imperial and industrial powers and the rest of the world grew, global and national inequalities 
were most often represented and explained in civilizational and racial terms, i.e. that some 
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races or social groups were inherently, and hereditarily superior to others, and such 
explanations of difference were also central to the emerging ‘sciences of man’ of the 
nineteenth century, including sociology and economics.13 The assumption that inequalities of 
income and wealth reflected natural inequalities contributed to a generalised lack of attention 
to individual distribution in the emerging discipline of economics. Nonetheless, classical 
economists were interested in differences in income between countries and, principally, 
between ‘factors’ of production , that is functional distributions.14 Seeing inequality 
functionally means asking how income is allocated to each factor of production (such as 
labour and capital) in relation to its contribution to the production process. For instance, 
Classical economists such as David Ricardo and Karl Marx, were more concerned with 
differences in aggregate income between classes - say labourers or the owners of capital – 
than with more fine grained accounts that took into account individuals, and social roles other 
than those of direct production (including gender and race, for instance).15 Despite the 
‘marginalist revolution’ in economics from the late nineteenth century onwards leading the 
discipline to focus on the role of individual actors in markets, the neoclassical approach it 
produced was largely uninterested on individual incomes, regarding them as determined by 
productivity and demand.16  
 
The onset of the Great Depression and mass unemployment in the 1930s sparked renewed 
concerns about poverty and, to an extent, inequality. Nevertheless, the approach taken by 
recently created statistical offices on both sides of the Atlantic continued to focus on 
functional distributions of income. The influence of Keynes’s economic ideas was 
significant, providing a way to combine liberal and classical economics concerns with 
efficiency with a justification for redistributive interventions aimed at full employment and 
supporting labour’s share of national income.17 Such understandings were reinforced by New 
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Deal era liberal corporatism (and in Europe by the development of equivalent neo-corporatist 
institutions after the war), where labour unions became a mediator for political and social 
citizenship, contributing to institutionalising the male breadwinner model through 
employment-based access to welfare. This model directed the attention of policy makers and 
statisticians to aggregates of labour income, and away from questions of personal 
distribution.  
 
The United States emerged from the Second World War as the world’s largest industrial 
producer and exporter, experiencing a continued period of economic growth, job creation, 
and rapidly rising standards of living. This ‘Golden Age’ gradually spread to Western Europe 
under the Pax Americana and the aegis of a new network of international economic 
institutions. The thirty years from the mid-1940s to the mid-1970s, while not eradicating 
poverty, undoubtedly improved living standards across western Europe and North America. 
By 1958 J.K. Galbraith could assert: ‘[F]ew things are more evident in modern social history 
than the decline of interest in inequality as an economic issue (…) inequality has ceased to 
preoccupy men’s minds.’ For the author of The Affluent Society the cause was simple, if 
misguided: “increased production is [seen as] an alternative to redistribution.”18 Recent 
reconstructions of patterns of income and wealth distribution show that the period between 
the end of the Second World War and the 1970s saw an almost unprecedented reduction in 
economic inequality across the West, driven by rising levels of employment and income; tax 
and transfer policies that alleviated market inequalities, as well as the through the effect of 
the World Wars and inflation on accumulated wealth.19 The ‘Golden Age’ took the sting out 
of inequality as a political issue. The intellectual and disciplinary lenses of the economics 
profession, as well as generalised belief that inequality had been falling since the end of the 
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war meant that there was a lack of systematic and sustained interest in constructing measures 
that spanned the entire population, although a few lone voices spoke against this disregard.20  
 
Lacking reliable indicators and the interest to use the existing data on inequality meant that 
once patterns of inequality started changing, these were largely invisible to the public. The 
economic troubles of the 1970s and 1980s – including rising poverty and unemployment - 
prompted a ‘rediscovery of inequality’ in the 1980s.21 Nevertheless, despite this fresh breath 
of interest, the issue failed to grip the public’s moral imagination during the 1980s and 1990s. 
Politics was, in part, to blame: even if by the 1980s many economists, statisticians and 
campaigners were demanding greater attention to the measurement of distribution, there is 
evidence that governments, particularly those directed by a re-energised form of economic 
liberalism, actively diverted their efforts, contributing to the public’s ignorance of changing 
inequalities.22 Politics was also emmeshed with statistical knowledge in other ways: as 
O’Connor points out in her analysis of the United States, the prejudices of several generations 
of politicians, economists and statisticians meant that available distributional data, built 
around the model of the white male worker was blind to the workings of structural 
inequalities of race and gender. As such, ‘inequality knowledge’ did not intersect with 
‘poverty knowledge’ that showed a concentration of deprivation amongst women and 
African-Americans – allowing the New Right to fill the void with renewed arguments about 
the cultural roots of poverty, diverting attention away from inequality.23 Nonetheless, despite 
the limits of the available data, evidence on evolution of inequality was mounting. By the 
early 1990s, a number of studies pointed towards a sustained increase in inequalities and to 
the likely growing share of income of the top percentiles of earners.24  
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The historical digression above shows on the production of inequality knowledge evolved 
towards the point when, in the the early 2000s, Piketty and Saez could produce their graph 
showing the rise in top income shares. Their work generated considerable academic and some 
press attention, and by that point it can be said that representation of inequality as personal 
distribution of income was well established. However, this does not mean it had become a 
political issue. Citation analyses reveal that the ‘take-off’ in interest in the paper happened 
only after 2011 and the mobilisation of OWS.25 Why did this knowledge fail to make an 
impact over the 1990s and 2000s? McCall’s analysis of media attention to inequality in the 
US between 1980 and 2010 reveals that, despite some spikes in coverage, there was limited 
media discussion. McCall attributes this to the interplay between the availability of data - 
which increased throughout the period, with little impact on the level of media coverage – 
and the framing of the problem. Attention to inequality only flared up when it was tied to a 
narrative of its impact on the middle class, going against cherished American narratives of 
equality of opportunity.26 While these ‘peaks’ of inequality-related media discussion recede 
into insignificance in the face of the post-2011 level of attention, they suggest the emergence 
of this issue is less related to its actual incidence than to the ability of critical actors to change 
the narrative. What was different about 2011 was the way in which a new political actor was 
able to draw on the mounting economic data about inequality and reframe it in relation to the 
anxieties and sense of insecurity of part of the middle classes, under growing pressure from 
two decades of ‘winner takes all’ model of globalisation.  
 
ii. Global insecurities: the western middle class and global inequality 
 
There is evidence that growing income and wealth inequalities within western nations have 
not only affected the relative position of the poor, but also led to a ‘hollowing out’, or 
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‘stretching out’ of the middle class.27 If in Britain there are indications that welfare was able 
to keep the income share of the bottom half relatively stable, in the US the incomes of the 
bottom 50% have been consistently degraded between 1980 and 2014, with the post-tax 
income growth of the bottom standing at just 21% over the period (but just 4% for the lowest 
quintile), while the figure for the top 1% is 194% (and treble that for the top 0.001%).28 Other 
data suggests that the United States and Britain saw the largest declines in the income share 
of the middle classes in rich nations between the 1980s and 2010, and at the same time some 
of the largest gains accruing to the top 5%.29 So, while the middle and lower middle classes 
of western nations are absolutely better off than thirty years previously, their gains were 
small, especially compared the rewards accruing to those at the top. Opportunity and mobility 
have been curtailed, and perhaps more significantly, there has been a shift in who earns, and 
how they earn. Lower-skilled but previously ‘good’ jobs have been degraded in terms of pay, 
conditions and security, and women and migrants have entered the workforces of western 
economies in greater numbers, challenging the position of ‘native’ male workers. The 
combination of increased economic uncertainty for the middle classes and a sense that 
traditional social hierarchies of class and gender are changing is said to be behind a turn to 
socially conservative positions – ranging from increased support for nationalist parties, the 
British ‘Brexit’ vote, or the election of Donal Trump to the US presidency. Several authors 
have linked these political choices to anxieties over status, especially for a those in the lower 
middle classes – and of men in these groups - whose status derived from their role as main 
breadwinners and embodiments of national self-imagination. Such dynamics are undoubtedly 
important, but it is worth asking whether the drivers of status anxiety are purely national, and 
affect only the lower middle classes.  
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The self-imagination of western nations is intrinsically bound up with a hierarchical view of 
the world; one that places the ‘west’ in a position of superiority vis-à-vis other parts of the 
globe. While globalisation is often invoked as the cause of economic changes affecting 
western middle (and particularly lower middle) classes, its effect on political choices is 
seldom explored. Yet, arguably, citizens in these countries are also increasingly aware of 
their position in a globalised economy. During the first decade of the new millennium, 
according to a PEW survey of US citizens, a majority of respondents saw the emergence of 
China as a world power as a ‘major threat’. Tellingly, in 2009, as the effects of the global 
financial crash were felt, the proportion of US respondents seeing China as world’s leading 
economic power (44 %) overtook those who saw the US as the leading economy (27%) for 
the first time.30 Making such comparisons requires knowledge about global inequalities – a 
social imaginary of ‘stylized facts’ about the distribution of wealth across nations and, for 
instance in discussions about the Asian ‘middle classes’, about personal distributions of 
income on a global scale. Just as with knowledge about within country inequalities, the 
availability of such knowledge required the development of conventions and tools of 
measurement over several decades.  
 
Between the Second World War and the 1980s, the question of global distribution of incomes 
gradually came to the attention of the field of development economics, encouraged by the 
establishment of international organisations tasked with advising and directing national 
policy makers in a changing, decolonising world in the 1940s and 1950s.31 An emerging 
constellation of international organisations, from the World Bank to the United Nations, 
found in GDP estimates a system of comparison and abstraction that made their global remit 
manageable. And, for newly independent post-colonial nations, it offered a means to 
comprehend and modernize the nation. Whether the “household” was the most appropriate 
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unit of analysis everywhere, the degree of monetization of different forms of production and 
exchange, the complexities of each national context were lost in the universalizing flattening 
of GDP calculations. The development of the concept of a global economy and of the 
possibility of comparison revealed, in Speich’s words, “a sensational new view of the world 
as a place of enormous poverty,” and of vast inequalities between nations.32 This vision of 
inequality was a double-edged sword. While it constrained an understanding of a diverse and 
complex world within a western-derived productivist and ostensibly de-politicized model; it 
also helped reveal an exploited “Third World,” producing stylized facts that could be used to 
mobilize anti-colonial and post-colonial movements.33 While the centrality of poverty and 
distribution within the World Bank waned during the heyday of structural adjustment 
agendas in the 1980s, the Bank continued to be a key producer of statistics on global 
distribution of incomes, particularly after 2000.  
 
The measurement of inter-personal inequality on a global scale continues to present greater 
logistical challenges than estimates of personal income distribution in wealthier nations 
(which are also data-rich).34 In recent decades, however, a body of work on global personal 
distributions of income has offered a new picture of both startling inequalities, but also of the 
changing position of the western middle classes which, combined with the dissemination of 
other ‘stylized facts’ about the narrowing gap ‘emerging’ and ‘established’ economies, has 
fed anxieties and insecurities that contributed to the politicisation of inequality. 35 If in the 
1960s such data reinforced the idea of an impoverished ‘third world’, by the early twenty-
first century, it fed a sense of anxiety and insecurity about the subversion of global 
hierarchies. Since the turn of the millennium, western media have recurrently deployed 
statistics about the size and wealth of Asian middle classes or predicting the point in time at 
which large emerging economies will ‘overtake’ western nations. 
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With the rapid growth of large countries in the South, particularly China and India, first from 
the 1980s, and especially from 2000 onwards, the idea of a new global middle class has 
appeared. ‘Middle classes’ in these developing countries have narrowed the gap that 
separates them those in the west. In comparative terms, the middle and lower middle classes 
of the rich west have been the ‘losers’ in this process, seeing their incomes grow by the 
smallest proportion across the global distribution – if not stagnate completely.36 In absolute 
terms, this global ‘middle class’ is still significantly poorer than the middle and even lower 
middle classes of rich western nations; but this is scant consolation for Europeans and North 
Americans who compare their prospects to those of the generation that preceded them and 
feel increasingly insecure about the future. Preserving living standards in the global north is 
now likely to require enduring more precarious forms of employment; working longer hours, 
and for a longer period before retirement than in previous generations.37 This rebalancing of 
global distribution interacts with the rise of insecurity in rich western nations in ways that are 
of significance to understand the conditions of politicisation of inequality.  
 
The experience of insecurity, whether it is linked directly to the experience of economic 
deprivation or simply to its threat, has the potential to bring to the fore questions of fairness 
and desert.38 In the wake of Donald Trump’s election to the US Presidency, much has been 
made of his appeal to the ‘white’ working class, and similar arguments have been made out 
the Brexit supporting electorate in Britain. But precarity and insecurity have also affected a 
growing cohort of young people who a few decades previous would bear the hallmarks of 
entry into the middle and upper middle classes: urban, holding professional qualifications, 
and often children of parents who were themselves securely middle class. And it was this 
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constituency in particular that embraced the message of the OWS movement, and which 
helped put inequality on the agenda in 2011.39  
 
iii. From the Global Justice Movement to Occupy Wall Street 
 
Occupy Wall Street – the occupation of Zuccotti Park, a small square in New York’s 
financial district, between September and November 2011 – was the moment when the 
framing of the ‘99% vs the 1%’ brought inequality centre stage, particularly in the United 
States and Britain. Contrasting the accumulation of resources in an elite with the experiences 
of everyone else was a remarkably successful proposition, and one which arguably helped 
OWS reach a wide audience, providing a pithy message that 24h news media could package 
and broadcast. It was the movement’s choice of this frame that transposed ‘stylized facts’ 
produced by academics and other experts to a much wider audience giving a political edge to 
the concerns of the western middle classes.  
 
However, it was not a given that anti-austerity movements would choose this particular frame 
to highlight the injustices of neo-liberal agendas. European anti-austerity movements such as 
the Spanish Indignados (which inspired the creation of OWS) mobilised around issues that 
differed from the US or British Occupy. While economic issues were central to these 
mobilisations, they tended to be articulated in terms of social rights of citizenship, rather than 
in terms of economic inequality, arguably because the experience of inequality in those 




Why OWS ended up focusing on economic inequality is related to the way it emerged from a 
diffuse network of activists linked to anti-globalisation campaigns of the previous decade. In 
terms of overlap of issues, tactics and often of activists, the OWS was an inheritor of anti-
globalisation mobilisations from the late 1990s known as the Global Justice Movement 
(GJM), linked to the protests at the World Economic Forum in Seattle in 1998, and to the 
various World Social Forum (WSF) meetings in the late 1990s and early 2000s. The GJM 
was in many ways a novel movement, reflecting the emergence of a global imaginary, linked 
by the frame of ‘anti-globalisation’ – more precisely, by opposition to a market-driven 
globalisation - and by the aim to promote an ‘alter-globalisation’ founded on democratic 
accountability and a commitment to human rights.41 In that sense, it was a social movement 
in part informed by the picture of global disparity revealed by the growing body of 
knowledge produced since the 1980s. Yet its arguments were rarely articulated through the 
lens of income inequalities: GJM and WSF debates tended to focus instead on the operation 
of social inequalities (including those of race and gender), and how these were connected to 
questions of power, with money an intervening variable, not the focus of attention. The 
adversaries of the GJM were corporations, governments and systems, more than the rich as 
individuals.42 
 
While it served as the entry point to left-wing activism to a generation, the GJM as a global 
movement lost steam after 2005, as some activist groups waned and participation at social 
forum meetings dropped; even if pockets of activism persisted.43 Some of the causes of this 
decline were cyclical: its novelty faded somewhat, and with it the attention of international 
media; other issues such as the Iraq war diverted supporters; and protest fatigue was 
undoubtedly a factor. But there were also significant internal debates and divisions that 
contributed to the deflation of the movement. The GJM’s diverse constituency had been 
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brought together by the opposition to a capital-led globalisation; but there was less agreement 
on the strategies and principles to build an alternative. Eschle has highlighted the differences 
between marxist critics of globalisation, who emphasised its economic dimension and those 
who took a more intersectional approach, concerned with gender, race and other forms of 
identity as vectors of oppression.44 The GJM was divided on how to articulate these identities 
and strategies, on whether to call upon individuals as exploited workers or as excluded and 
oppressed minorities - questions that have characterised debates across the left since the 
1970s.45 There was also disagreement over who should be the target of claims: transnational 
corporations and international organisations, or national governments? At what level should 
solutions and redress for injustice be sought – what are the responsibilities of the nation-state, 
and how do these relate to powerful transnational actors, be them other nations or 
corporations? 46 By the early 2000s, beset by rifts, the GJM turned towards more local forms 
of action and anti-capitalist movements did not manage to mobilise in the numbers or with 
the visibility they had in around the turn of the millennium. Although present in some mass 
protests such as the anti-war demonstrations of 2004, their ability to energise large 
transnational protests seemed to have gone. 47  
 
A decade later, after 2010, a new wave of protest flared up in different parts of the globe. 
Anti-regime protests in Tunisia sparked mobilisations across North Africa and the Middle 
East, including in Egypt and Syria. By the Spring of 2011, mass protests had also appeared in 
the Southern European countries most affected by the consequences of the 2008 financial 
crisis. Soon similar protests followed in other parts of the world, including Occupy Wall 
Street. These movements were heterogenous, rooted in local conditions, but also linked by an 
emulation of ideas, imagery and tactics, which included the use of social media as a tool of 
mobilization and the occupation of public space as a means to garner visibility.48  
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While many of the supporters that flocked to Zuccotti Park were new to protest, the core of 
activists and organisations that put the occupation in place had been active in challenging 
neo-liberal politics in the US for some time, and many had links to GJM.49 However, the 
great majority of the latter’s activists were younger and had few ties to earlier movements.50 
But they could draw on the earlier movement’s ideas, tactics and experience.51 The groups 
that initiated OWS, had continued to face the same dilemmas of the earlier cycle, in particular 
how to construct a political subject and a mobilising identity that could both connect the 
disparate cores of activism and go beyond them to mobilise much more widely. A detailed 
account of OWS recounts how this problem came to a head in discussions over the creation 
of New York City General Assembly, by groups that were aiming to follow up the radical 
magazine Adbusters’ call for the occupation of Wall Street: ‘…the would be occupiers were 
unable to settle on a single demand. (…) The anarchists opposed any demands that addressed 
themselves to states, parties, or elected officials. (…) Conversely the populists, pragmatists 
and democratic socialists opposed demands that did not address what they saw as the root 
causes of the crisis, namely neo-liberal economics and the top-down politics of the “1 
percent”.’52 Gould-Wartofsky suggests that the need to find a message that could square such 
differences opened up the way for the 99% slogan. Whether or not it was the academic and 
activist David Graber, who personally invented the frame of the 99 vs the 1%, his account 
showa how it usefully addressed the problem. Graber was in contact with the Adbusters 
editorial team, who had launched the #OccupyWallStreet meme. Seeking ways to give the 
event a broader appeal, Graber recalled having read a column by the Nobel Prize winning 
economist Joseph Stiglitz referencing the Piketty and Saez data on inequality. Graber says 
that ‘…it also struck me that since 1 percent effectively was what we referred to as “Wall 
Street,” this was the perfect solution to our problem: who were the excluded voices frozen 
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out of the political system, and why were we summoning them to the financial district in 
Manhattan (…)? If Wall Street represented the 1 percent, then we’re everybody else.”53 As 
several commentators have noted, the frame of the 99 vs the 1% was one of the key to the 
OWS’ mass success and one of its shortcomings. It echoes the call by the influential left 
theorists Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe to create a ‘populist reason’ and construct a 
mass democratic subject based on an expansive collective identity.54 It was a ‘floating 
signifier’ to which supporters could attach their own meaning: a survey of occupiers and 
supporters show that most often cited reason for joining OWS was ‘inequality/the 1%’.55 As 
one interviewee stated: ‘There was total clarity who the bad guys were’.56 The combination 
of a popular frame, occupation tactic, location, and a savvy media strategy gave OWS impact 
and placed inequality firmly on the agenda.57 Media outlets in the US provided extended 
coverage to the occupation, and accompanying it was a spike in mentions of ‘economic 
inequality’ and although the rate of mentions dropped after the end of OWS, the issue was 
established, as were mentions to the ‘1%’.58  
 
This framing of the issue of injustice through economic inequality addressed a political 
dilemma facing anti-capitalist protesters. But it was only available in this form because of the 
accumulation of ‘stylized facts’, in Hirschman’s term, about income distribution generated by 
economists during the previous decade. Piketty’s graph did not ‘occupy Wall Street’, but 
OWS could not have existed in the same way if it had not been able to point to statistics that 
had been slowly making their way from academic papers to mainstream publications via 
radical magazines such as Mother Jones.59 The ‘Occupy moment’ – and the longer 
politicisation of inequality it generated – has to be explained by this triangulation between 
knowledge, audience and political agency. However, the pivotal use of the 99 vs 1% frame 
also had costs, which we can relate at least partially to the movement’s failure to sustain 
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mobilisation. It also contributed to narrowing those debates, emphasising the economic 
dimensions of inequality over its social and political causes and helping to ‘nationalise’ 
inequality as a political issue, to the neglect of its global dimension.  
 
 
iv. Problematising the 99% vision of inequality 
 
When visiting the Occupy camp outside St. Paul’s Cathedral in London during the early part 
of 2012, one of the posters that grabbed my attention was a sign occupiers had posted in a 
corner of the square. Neatly made, it reproduced a London street sign but read ‘Tahrir 
Square, EC1’, the local postcode. In the spirit of many of the protests of the time, it playfully 
encapsulated the solidarity and recognition that protesters in London offered to their Egyptian 
counterparts. However, it also suggested how these protests – for better and for worse – 
nationalised repertoires and strategies. This was also what happened to the issue of 
inequality. The success of the 99 vs 1% slogan – particularly in the US and in Britain - had 
two significant effects: firstly, it reproduced the focus on quantitative, economic aspects of 
inequality even whilst trying to highlight their political dimension; and secondly, it diverted 
attention from questions of global inequality which had been central to the Global Justice 
Movement. 
 
Critics and supporters alike have suggested that the breadth of the 99% identity label, its 
‘populist’, homogenising appeal, made it difficult for activist to negotiate diversity within the 
movement. Juris et al noted the existence of cleavages between white, middle class activists, 
more at home in the individualised forms of activism that characterised OWS, and the 
traditionally more ‘communitarian’ politics of ethnic minority activists. This led to the 
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internal dynamics of various Occupy camps becoming increasingly fraught, as participants 
tried (unsuccessfully) to raise issues of class, race, sexual orientation and gender within the 
movement, and as strategic issues.60 Such difficulty in acknowledging social difference can 
also be related to the way in which the quantification of inequality has led us to individualise 
it: popular websites invite viewers to input their income details, positioning them in 
percentiles of distribution; and campaigning organisations such as Oxfam name the eight 
individuals whose combined wealth is equal to that of 3.7 billion of the world’s population.61 
Seeing inequality through the lens of aggregates is not necessarily superior to seeing it in 
individualised terms: both have the potential to reveal important dynamics (Piketty, for 
instance, uses both methods his work). But the choice has consequences for what inequalities 
are made visible, and for the politics that can flow from it. 
 
A second important aspect of OWS was its national focus. In this sense, it was closer to the 
anti-austerity movements witnessed in Europe - with an emphasis on national discourses, 
national sovereignty and symbols - than to the GJM movements that preceded it.62 Despite its 
global projection, OWS focused more on the complicities between the US financial and 
political systems than on inequality as a global problem. Some US Social Forum activists 
(from the GJM tradition of activism) were highly critical of OWS for failing ‘to generate an 
analysis of the global causes of inequality that could guide and sustain activism over time.’63 
This leads to the question of who the ‘99%’ are, and how far is the global south part of the 
picture. If not part of the global ‘1%’, the western middle classes are not far off that 
percentile in terms of wealth and income – Milanovic estimates that 12% of the US and 5% 
of the UK population are amongst the global 1% in terms of income.64 Displacing the blame 
for the world’s ills towards the ill-defined ‘1%’ helps the upper middle classes of western 
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nations to continue ignoring their complicity in processes that generate and reproduce 
inequality and injustice on a global scale.  
 
Inadvertently, Occupy’s left populism parallels that of right-wing movements such as the Tea 
Party or, more recently, Trump’s ‘Make America Great Again’. This is not to suggest a moral 
equivalence between the two; rather that for very different reasons both sought to mobilise 
visions of a ‘people’ that were primarily constructed against an ill-defined elite, rather than 
prompt an engagement with the political and social processes that produce inequalities. And 
while OWS was never ‘nationalist’ in an exclusionary sense, its ‘nationalisation’ of 
inequality was also a missed opportunity to bring the transnational dynamics of disparity into 
play in a more focused way.  
 
This chapter has explored the interaction between social knowledge, socio-economic 
conditions and mobilisation. By deploying ‘stylized facts’ produced by economists and 
technocrats, social movements were constitutive of the way in which inequality became a 
political issue. The importance of bringing the issue of inequality to the fore at this moment 
cannot be underestimated, but the terms under which it is framed matter. Causes of 
inequalities can and have be sought in differentials of power; in socially constructed 
boundaries of class, race or gender (to name but a few), in the operation of multiple 
overlapping institutions and rules that assign rewards and access to resources.65 Such 
processes operate across vast spaces spanning borders and continents, and the 
‘nationalisation’ of inequality stands in the way of understanding them, but also of the critical 
need to give voice to those who most suffer by it. As Nancy Fraser reminds us, representation 
is particularly problematic when flows of people, commodities, power, and the social and 
economic effects of their activity spill across the borders of territorialised sovereignty.66 
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These transnational factors are deeply implicated in the creation of global inequality, but 
recede into the background when the debate becomes multiple distinct debates about national 
inequalities. A further problem with the framing of the debate on inequality is its 
‘monetization’, or a narrow focus on inequalities of income or wealth. This makes it 
translatable in the language of economics – but, as Timothy Mitchell reminds us, ‘[t]o fix a 
self-contained sphere like the economy requires not only methods of counting everything 
within it, but also (…) some method of excluding what does not belong.’67 And what does 
not belong, or is not easy to bring back into the language of economic inequality, is power, 
politics and social constructs such as gender, race and borders, all dimensions that contribute 
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